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THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THE LEY DE COMPETENCIA OF MEXICO: A
COMPARATIVE REVIEW, 1992-1994.
ELEANOR M. FOX*
By these remarks, I shall try to put antitrust law into the context of
trade law in order to highlight their interrelationships. I shall give a
broad picture of why and how trade and competition have become linked,
and I shall state why we cannot keep up the barriers between trade and
antitrust law and between trade and antitrust lawyers if we are to solve
the trade/competition problems of North America or the world.
First, I shall address the interaction of trade and competition. Second,
after I raise some questions about tensions and relationships, I shall refer
to the European Economic Community (EEC) model, which has taken
account of just about every issues involved in the relationship of trade
and competition. Third, I will speak of trade-competition problems in
the world, most notably pending questions between Japan and the United
States, Eastman Kodak and Fuji, to convey the larger world dimension.
Fourth, I will deal more specifically with antitrust law - what is it, what
are the main categories, and how do we analyze them. Fifth, I am going
to reshuffle my explanation of antitrust law trade-related antitrust restraints. Sixth, to bring us back to the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)' and North America, I will set forth some proposals
of the ABA Antitrust Section NAFTA Task Force.2
First, the interaction of trade and competition. There are three categories
in which there are objectives and problems. The first category relates to
the following: trade law is about government restraints of trade and
antitrust law is about private restraints of trade. As the world shrinks,
we complete the various trade rounds and have freer trade in the sense
that government barriers are reduced farther and farther. As trade barriers
are reduced, new hurdles in the world trading system appear. Trade does
not move as freely as one might expect and one observes that there are
other barriers, including private barriers, to the free flow of trade. There
is concern that as government barriers recede, firms with market power
in their own backyard want to preserve that market power rather than
let the competition into the market. Antitrust law must be equal to the
task in tearing down private barriers. Thus, trade and competition problems are symbiotic. We may wish to maximize the common objectives

* Walter Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of Law.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex. (effective Jan. 1,
1994), 32 I.L.M. 605, [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Eleanor M. Fox, Report of the Task Force of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law on the
Competition Dimension of NAFTA, 1994 A.B.A. SEc. ANJTITRUST L. REP.
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of free trade and free competition. We may wish to do so across North
America and across the world. This is the first objective.
Second, national trade laws tend to protect business, whereas competition law protects competition. Competition law says, in effect, that
competition is good for you. It is good to serve consumers and to preserve
opportunities for competitors. If business cannot stand foreign competition, it should adjust. Adjustment is a necessary, dynamic process good
for the firm and good for the world trading system. Protective national
trade law and liberal antitrust law are in tension. The tension is captured
in part by stances on low pricing. Antitrust law regards low pricing as
the heart of competition. Low price competition increases trade and helps
consumers; the right of low pricing provides opportunities for the efficient
firm's entry and success in the marketplace. National trade laws, however,
repress low pricing when national industries are threatened. So we have
anti-dumping/price predation tension. Accordingly, a second objective is
to minimize the tensions between the national trade laws and the competition law.
A third objective involves convergence of law. When legal systems
require people to do the same thing in different ways, there are transactional costs. Sometimes, the differences are just a matter of practice,
a matter of tradition, rather than a difference in principle. I will adopt
the phrase used by Professor Kozolchyk and say one should look for
best practices. In antitrust law, one can look for best practices such as
common merger notification forms. We should seek out best practices
in antitrust law just as in any other kind of law or regulation. Thus,
there are three objectives: maximizing the free flow of trade and competition; minimizing the tensions between protectionist trade law and
liberal antitrust law; and eliminating unnecessary transaction costs.
I turn now to Europe because European thinkers have been pioneers
addressing these three objectives for the European internal market; i.e.,
the Common Market of the European Economic Community. While there
is much of the European Economic Community that you might rightly
say is not relevant to NAFTA, there is a great deal about the basic
economic blueprint that has very powerful lessons for North America.
The Treaty of Rome, which is the treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, was adopted in 1957. 3 The Treaty was conceived
after World War II when Europe was balkanized and each nation became
separate market unto itself. Business was very inefficient because of the
high tariff barriers. The brilliant idea behind the EEC was that if Europe
could be an integrated market, the tensions between the nations would
tend to disappear. The blueprint was an endorsement of the old Adam
Smith idea that people who trade together do not fight one another. It
was a political idea to be implemented through the power of economics.
The first initiative was to tear down all government barriers at member

3. Rome Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, BeIg.-F.G.R.-Fr.-Italy- Lux.-Neth., 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter
EEC].
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state borders; tariffs and quotas and measures of equivalent effect are
forbidden. As a corollary, states may not take anti-competitive traderestraining action unless the action passes a test requiring tight justification. States may not undertake industrial policy initiatives that protect
them at the expense of other states when such initiative interferes with
the flow of trade among and between member states.
There are many principles in the Treaty of Rome. Some are drawn
from the GATT itself and some have found their way into NAFTA.
There is a transparency principle and a national treatment principle. In
addition, in the EEC, the unitariness of trade and competition and the
impulse for free-flow of goods and services is reflected even in disciplines
on public procurement. Member states may not discriminate in their
procurement unless tightly justified for national security reasons.
The EEC has a common competition policy, and, as well, each member
state has its own antitrust law. Only with respect to big mergers does
the common competition policy overrides national law. Otherwise, member
states may apply their own competition laws as long as it does not conflict
with EEC competition law or enforcement. As for areas without common
policy, Europe has a harmonization program. Where convergence of law
is thought important to an economically unified Europe, certain strong
common principles are harmonized with rights of the member states to
effectuate the principles in their own way.
Moving to the world, the trade/competition problem is now under
consideration by various groups, including the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development and the World Trade Organization. Experts
are considering whether it may be necessary or helpful to have some
common world policy. The most recent dispute that is feeding into this
issue is the Kodak-Fuji dispute, which is a market access dispute, the
most prominent antitrust issue on the world trade agenda. The claim is
that Japan is barring access to Kodak and that the Japanese government,
responding to the lowering of trade barriers, "privatized protection" by
giving Fuji the tools to shut out foreign competition. Kodak has brought
a 301 petition in the United States. Fuji and the Japanese government
have denied all material facts. Fuji claims that Kodak has done to it,
in the United States, virtually all that Kodak alleges Fuji has done to
Kodak in Japan. We have Japanese antitrust issues, U.S. antitrust issues,
U.S. national trade law issues, and world trade law issues all wrapped
into one problem, and there is no good and sufficient home for resolution
of the total dispute.
I turn now to the specific content of antitrust law. U.S. antitrust law,
at this time, focuses on protecting consumers. While the law is designed
to protect the competition process, consumer welfare is the anchor. If

4. For a discussion of the controversy, see Helene Cooper, Kodak Case Against Japan is
Stronger Than That of Auto Firms, Analysts Say, WALL ST. J., June 9, 1995, at B4 and Wendy
Bounds, Fuji Says Kodak's Woes in Japan Stem from Bad Marketing, Not Unfair Trade, WALL
ST. J., June 22, 1995, at A4.
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the problem is a merger problem, we must ask if the companies getting
market power will cause prices to rise for consumers. If the problem is
a monopolist strategy, we must ask if the monopoly firm is responding
to the marketplace or is the monopoly firm putting cost on its rivals to
prevent them from getting to consumers.
The United States is very consumer-focused. In other countries of the
world there are additional values and objectives that underlie antitrust.
For example, in the EEC, market integration is a value of antitrust.
That free movement of goods across member state lines should not be
frustrated by private restraints is a major principle of EEC competition
law. The EEC also values small and middle size enterprise. And, it also
values protecting entrepreneurs from unfair abuses. In principle, as opposed to the carrying out or not of a program, U.S. law seems to be
the most laissez-faire of the antitrust systems of developed nations in
the world.
In the EEC, private restraints may be classified in the following categories: are they exploitative, or are they exclusionary? An exploitative
restraint is a restraint that harms buyers. A transaction may give a firm
the power and incentive to exploit the people buying from it. In all
countries, this is one of the most common kinds of restraints. Then there
are exclusionary restraints. Exclusionary restraints are restraints that keep
competitors out of the market or tend to do so. U.S. law treats exclusionary restraints skeptically. The conduct is usually not a violation, even
if it hurts competitors, unless it also hurts consumers. But many or most
other countries in the world will say unreasonable private exclusionary
action that is not justified as response to a market is an antitrust violation.
It is the "exclusionary market access" problem that has surfaced to the
top of the agenda of trade/competition in the world; and as I have
noted, nations are not in agreement on the components of an antitrust
violation. There may be a third concept in some countries in the world
- not the United States - and that is unfairness.
Let us look now at some common antitrust restraints. From the U.S.
point of view, if one asks for identification of the worst kind of violation,
the answer is cartels; i.e., agreements among competitors to eliminate
competition. If the cartelists are afraid that as soon as they raise their
prices others will come into the market and take new profit opportunities,
the firms might perfect their cartel with a boycott to keep the outsiders
out. In the United States, cartels are, per se, illegal. In many other places
in the world there are rules of law that are close to a per se rule.
U.S. law also prohibits "monopolization," but it does not prohibit
monopoly. People are encouraged to be the best they can, which in
theory could result in monopoly. We do not condemn monopoly in the
United States. We do not even condemn monopoly prices of a monopolist
as do some other countries or regions, including the European Community.
For the monopoly-type violation, let us take a Microsoft example.
Microsoft has about 80% of the operating systems for personal computers.
Microsoft deals with manufacturers of personal computers who want
licenses to put Microsoft's operating system in computers. Microsoft said
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to the manufacturers, "I won't license my operating systems to you
unless you pay me royalties for every computer you sell, whether or not
it contains Microsoft operating software." This was equivalent to Microsoft's refusing to license unless the PC manufacturer used exclusively
Microsoft operating software. Since the PC manufacturers needed to deal
with Microsoft, the clause had a monopolization effect. Microsoft would
have perfected the monopoly by conduct, not by competitive means.
On the other hand, if Microsoft develops a better product or sells at
a lower price that competitors can't meet because they're not as efficient,
that is fine. Competitors could, in theory, get wiped out. As a practical
matter, the efficient competitors probably will not get wiped out. They
will do something consumers want more and they'll stay in the market.
But U.S. law is very clear. It is very, very hard for any competitor to
win a price predation case because low-pricing is good and rock-bottom
pricing is better. Although courts differ on the appropriate cost standard,
usually unless the monopolist prices goes below marginal or average
variable cost enroute to booting out all of the competitors and then
raising its price to a monopoly price and recouping its losses, the lowpricing conduct is permissible under U.S. antitrust laws.
I turn now to vertical restraints. Vertical restraints are restraints in
the course of distribution. Schwinn Bicycle may say to its distributors,
"You sell only in this territory, you sell only to these authorized dealers,
etc." The United States looks at these practices very hospitably. If a
firm, not collaborating with its competitors, imposes restraints to help
it get to the market, the law lets it do so. Suppose such a firm had 20
competitors and the competitors do not cartelize. Each would have all
the incentives to get to the market in the best way possible. The law
would not "care" what each one did. It would be right to assume that
each was trying to do whatever it thought would serve consumers. As
an exception, resale price maintenance (RPM) pursuant to agreement is
per se illegal in the United States. If a firm does set minimum resale
prices, that probably means that it has market power and is trying to
exploit its buyers, or that it is using RPM as a device to collaborate
with its competitors to facilitate a cartel. All of these rules fit with a
consumer welfare model.
Three merger laws also fits with the model. Under U.S. merger law,
we ask whether the merger increases market power in a way that will
hurt consumers. Consider the recently proposed Microsoft-Intuit merger.3
The two firms compete in the money management software applications
market. Intuit had about 70% of the market and Microsoft had about
8%. The Justice Department stood firm against the merger and Microsoft
subsequently dropped plans to merge. The claim of the Justice Department
5. For a discussion of the controversy, see Viveca Novak, Microsoft and Government Will
Appeal Judge's Rejection of Antitrust Accord, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1995, at A3. Additionally,
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice also produced two News Releases commenting
on the Microsoft - Intuit merger dated April 27, 1995 (DOJ AT 241, 1995 WL 249007 (D.O.J.))
and May 20, 1995 (DOJ AT 284, 1995 WL 310719 (D.O.J.)).
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was that the merger would significantly eliminate competition, including
important technology competition, and by the firms best situated to
engage in technology competition.
There are other competitor collaborations other than cartels and other
then mergers. Joint ventures are a good example. Generally, if there is
no sense that the collaboration is really a cover for a cartel, in which
case it would be clearly illegal, and no sense that the reason for the
collaboration among competitors is to get the competition off their back,
then analysis is performed under a rule of reason. If the market is a
highly concentrated market and has high barriers, and the actors are the
leading firms in the market, there is potential for serious anti-competitive
effects through creation of market power. But, there may also be countervailing pro-competitive effects; the collaboration may help the firms
respond to the market. U.S. law is Quite liberal allowing competitor
collaboration, sometimes with restrictions allowing firms to collaborate
to realize synergy, where the collaboration promises to give consumers
or other buyers something they could not otherwise obtain.
I go on now to point five, trade-related antitrust measures, which I
shall call TRAMS. When we focus on trade-related antitrust problems,
we might review all of the antitrust principles I have just summarized,
but we might reshuffle the problems. The number one problem is barriers
to trade; i.e., market access problems. Removing market access barriers
fits with the first objective I specified above: maximizing the common
objectives of competition and trade. Barriers to trade created by private
persons by definition interfere with the flow of trade. The market access
problems of antitrust are:
(a.) Cartels with a boycott. Note that a cartel in itself is not exclusionary, but a cartel with a boycott is. Let me refer to allegations regarding
the glass industry. U.S. glass companies say, "We can't get into Japan.
The three Japanese producers are very powerful and they have taken
action to keep their power. They agree to keep prices high and to protect
those high prices. They agree to keep foreigners out. This they do by
tying up the whole distribution system." That is the number one problem:
cartels with a boycott. If you could prove it, it is a violation almost
anywhere in the world.
(b.) Market access problem - exclusive dealing. Suppose the same
market above. There are only three glass producers. Each one independently and not in collaboration with another has an exclusive relationship
with a dealer. Suppose it has good business reasons for saying, "I need
an exclusive dealership to get my glass sold in the most efficient way."
And suppose also that it is difficult for an outsider to establish its own
distributorship in Japan. This is a vertical restraint. Vertical restraints
violations are harder to prove. Why doesn't the outsider get its own
distributor? Why doesn't the outsider contract with Japanese firms to
have its product distributed? Is the outsider's product good? Is the product
appealing to Japanese consumers? Why doesn't the outsider just compete
harder to do business in Japan? What is the proof that the incumbent
producers are not competing ?ainst one another? What is the proof
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that they are using their dealers to help them collaborate rather than
compete?
(c.) Market access as a monopoly problem. Monopolistic conduct may
be access-restraining. A discriminatory government procurement policy e.g., buy-national for telecommunications equipment - is a private restraint. State-owned commercial enterprises, as well as private entrepreneurs, might engage in exclusionary conduct.
The above refers to exclusionary restraints as undercutting free trade
objectives. Exploitative transactions also play a role in decreasing trade.
Suppose a monopolistic merger in Country A of firms whose sales are
in the rest of the world. This is an exploitative transaction with spillover effects. Some commentators propose that, precisely because of the
externalities, there should be a merger control system for the world.
Thus far, I have identified exclusionary and exploitative restraints.
Now, I would like to introduce a problem that does not fit neatly into
either box. This may be called the Japanese electronics or Matsushita
problem. 6 In fact, you do not appreciate the problem except by lifting
yourself up to the pinnacle and looking down on all the impacts in the
world. The Matsushita problem is this: Japanese electronics firms conspired in Japan to raise prices in Japan. The cartel allowed the Japanese
companies to get extra profits in Japan. Protecting their market (from
too much supply) in Japan and desirous of achieving a large U.S. market
penetration, the firms sold their excess Japanese products at a very low
price in the United States that was not provable at the austere level that
we call predatory pricing.
The central problem is that there can be national industrial strategies
to protect one's own market, give one's companies extra profits, and
give those companies a war chest so they can sell abroad with comfort,
even at marginal cost, and thus "invade" the foreign territory. Now, is
that good or bad for the United States as the "foreign territory?" People
have different views. Consumers are getting low-priced electronic products
but the U.S. electronics industry is getting wiped out. U.S. industry labels
this Japanese strategy unfair. If the Japanese electronics industry did not
have a cartel in Japan, low-pricing would be legitimate. U.S. industry
claims the protected Japanese market makes the strategic behavior unfair.
Well, it is unfair, and so at the risk of being expelled from the U.S.
antitrust bar, I list as a trade/competition problem: unfairness - the
Matsushitaproblem. Is there something we should do about the Matsushita
problem at the world trading level? Yes, we should take steps to assure
that the foreign markets are not closed.
The second objective I propose for TRAMS is minimizing the tensions
between trade and antitrust in the field of low pricing. Antitrust price
predation rules, which favor sustainable low prices, and national antidumping laws, which protect domestic industries from low-price corn-

6. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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petition that will harm them, should be re-examined and brought more
closely into harmony.
The third objective for TRAMS is eliminating unnecessary transactions
costs: adoption of best practices. Common merger forms ought to be
designed for North America, or the countries should adopt a policy of
mutual recognition. At least, each country ought to accept the other
country's merger form in the first instance, to avoid unnecessary transactions costs; with the right to demand supplemental filings for markets
unique to the regulating country. More conceptual problems, such as the
vertical restraints law, could also be put on the "convergence" agenda.
How efficient it would be if a transcontinental company could design
one distribution system for a continent, rather than one for each country.
One would want to ask: How different are our laws from Mexican laws?
Are the differences matters of principle? Or are the gains from harmonizing more than the costs of giving up the difference?
Finally, I will say a word about the NAFTA Task Force of the ABA
Antitrust Section and its work in the area of convergence of U.S. and
Mexican law. The Task Force considered whether there should be common
substantive antitrust law for North America. We looked at the laws of
Canada, the United States and Mexico. It was our view that those laws
are quite similar. They are not far apart, and with -conversation and
discussion, which we and the agencies have with one another, the natiopal
laws tend to converge towards best practices. Through cross-fertilization,
people may come to appreciate that somebody's way is better than theirs;
with sunlight and understanding, law tends to converge.
Having this in mind, our recommendations are not very dramatic on
the point of convergence. Although, maybe the time will come for a
common competition policy on trade-related issues in North America,
that time has not yet arrived and we made certain proposals for today.
We propose that the NAFTA parties agree to enforce their antitrust laws;
they should maximize the transparency of their law and its applications;
and they should participate in frequent consultations and frequent workshops designed around the more difficult and the more meaningful traderelated antitrust problems in North America. In substantive analysis, the
idea of community recurs. We recommend that each party take account
of anti-competitive harms and benefits throughout the community of
nations, so as to move away from a parochial, narrowly-limited vision.
We suggested also that the NAFTA Article 1504 Working Group develop
a short list of subject areas and proposed principles in the trade-related
areas. The list should include not only prohibitory law against certain
likely to harm trade and competition in North America (e.g., cartels),
but also permissive law likely to facilitate trade and competition in North
American, such as certain joint ventures and rules for distribution. Working from this short list of subject areas and proposed principles, we hope
that harmonization will emerge.

